The US' near-unconditional support is bad for Israel
Israel needs international legitimacy to survive. Enabling impunity for Israeli transgressions is undermining this, including in America.

On December 2 2023, US Vice President Harris spoke in Dubai, UAE on “the Conflict Between Israel and Hamas”. After strongly supporting Israel’s right to defend itself, Harris said “Palestinians have a right to dignity and self-determination. And Israelis and Palestinians must enjoy equal measures of prosperity and freedom.” The next month, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu tweeted1 “I will not compromise on full Israeli security control on all territory west of the river Jordan, and this is contrary to a Palestinian state.” Three month after that, President Biden signed a $17b aid package for Israel.
This episode is an unusually glaring example of a decades-long pattern where Israel violates American policy and the US responds, in President Biden’s words, with “ironclad support”. In UN Security Council resolutions, there are instances of the US declining to veto or even supporting resolutions which Israel clashed with almost all the way back to the establishment of the region’s current borders in 1967, most notably relating to Israel building settlements, whose population now exceeds 700,000, in occupied territory. Yet over this period, Israel has received almost twice as much US aid as any other country, worth over $300b adjusted for inflation, enjoyed priority access to sales of cutting-edge US weapons systems, and benefitted from dozens of US vetoes of other UN security council resolutions challenging Israel.
Impunity has driven political radicalisation in Israel
People respond to incentives. During the current war, Israeli leaders have admitted to being forced into action by external pressure. When far-right Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich was asked why aid has not been cut to Gaza as an attempt to force the release of hostages, he said “[w]e bring in aid because there is no choice…we need international legitimacy for this war.” Historically, there is precedent for major change in Israeli policy in response to an external shock. After Israel conquered the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt in 1967, Israel rebuffed Egyptian offers of a peace deal in exchange for the return of the Sinai. In 1973, Egypt led a surprise attack which, although ultimately defeated, achieved enough success that after the war Israel’s Prime Minister, Defence Minister and military Chief of Staff all resigned. Once the resultant political crisis had abated, Israel quickly began negotiations with Egypt, and by 1979 had agreed to return the Sinai in exchange for peace. Thus, Egypt’s demonstration that it was a serious military threat changed Israel’s assessment of its options, and its policy adapted accordingly.
In recent decades, as well as during the current war, the US has undermined Israel’s incentives to respect its neighbours and the international community more broadly. America has continued to provide military support, including deploying US forces to deter, and on one occasion help defeat, attacks by Israel’s adversaries. It has also continued to provide resolute diplomatic support. For example, after the International Criminal Court’s Prosecutor requested an arrest warrant for Netanyahu, the Biden administration said it would work with Congress on sanctions against the ICC, and Netanyahu was invited to speak before a joint session of Congress.
The radicalisation of Israeli politics in response to this warped incentive structure has not been linear. After Netanyahu’s first premiership came Barak, and after Sharon’s came Olmert. Nonetheless, over time the evolution has been clear, especially in recent years. In 2018 Israel made controversial changes to its basic law, analogous to constitutional reform in America. Israel’s current government includes Smotrich, who was previously arrested on suspicion of terrorism, Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir who was previously deemed too extreme to serve in the IDF, and coalition member Zvi Sukot who was previously expelled from the West Bank due to suspicion of involvement in violent attacks against Palestinians. Under this government, violence by Israeli settlers in the West Bank was at record levels even before October 7; and further legal reforms were advanced whose opponents characterised them as a “judicial coup”.
Occupation hasn’t achieved its objectives
Through 57 years of the post-1967 occupation, major Palestinian defiance has never been prevented for long. The current war has seen an unprecedented level of violence. Despite this, some in the Israeli media predicted from the outset that it would not destroy Hamas, the organisation currently leading Palestinian resistance, while others reported Hamas was reconstituting forces in areas the IDF had said had been cleared from early in the campaign. By June, one US expert on national security summarised the situation simply as “Hamas is winning”.
The persistence of Palestinian resistance is reflected in reactions from officials across Israel’s political spectrum. On the relative left, the IDF’s chief spokesperson (and former special forces soldier) Daniel Hagari took the extraordinary step for a person in his role of saying on Israeli TV, in response to Netanyahu’s stated goal of total victory over Hamas, that “anyone who thinks we can eliminate Hamas is wrong” and called for a “governmental alternative”. On the right, the response has been a string of extreme statements, many of which were cited in South Africa’s genocide complaint to the International Court of Justice against Israel.
Support for Israel is weakening
To date, the US’ Israel policy has not changed, and Israel’s military remains regionally ascendant, certainly when backed by US-led forces. But there are clear signs that support for Israel is fracturing.
Internationally, over the course of the war support from Israel has declined from unprecedented strength in the wake of the October 7 attacks into unprecedented weakness, including announced restrictions on arms supplies to Israel by close US allies and charges at the ICJ and ICC of genocide and war crimes. While those cases are ongoing, Ehud Olmert, Israel’s Prime Minister from 2006-2009 and a former lawyer as well as Likud cabinet colleague of Netanyahu, recently wrote that “Israel Will Have No Defense When It Is Charged With Crimes Against the Palestinians”.
In the US, even the self-described ironclad supporters in the Biden administration have repeatedly found themselves repudiating instances of particularly egregious Israeli conduct including, most recently, the abuse of Palestinians prisoners, which included sexual abuse. Jewish American leaders have been sharply critical of Israeli leadership, with the most senior among them, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, saying that Netanyahu had lost his way and should call elections.
Polling data indicates differences between the two allies are set to grow. Young Israelis are extremely right-wing: even prior to October 7, 73% of Jewish Israelis aged 18-24 identified as right-wing. By contrast, while polling Americans’ views about this topic is challenging, multiple polls have found support for Israel to be weaker, perhaps much weaker, among younger Americans.
One thus cannot dismiss a scenario where the current US-Israeli alliance fails, as Israel’s increasingly right-wing electorate leads to ever-more extreme policies and American patience for Israeli disregard for US priorities is exhausted.
A better path for everyone
The status quo isn’t working for anybody. Israeli efforts to subjugate the Palestinians are at their nadir after decades of failure, even if Israel’s political system is unable to confront that reality. Palestinians are suffering grievously. Countries across the globe are suffering real if more modest impacts from disruption to sea and air transit routes through the region caused by the war. The US itself is spending billions on its military presence in the area, and suffering some of its own reputational damage by being associated with Israeli transgressions.
The US would thus be serving the true interests of all stakeholders, even if their political leaders may protest, by using its power to change how it supports Israel so that it ceases to enable frequent conduct that cannot be justified. That does not mean abandoning Israel to Hamas and Hizballah but it does mean, as Vice President Harris says, dignity, self-determination, freedom and prosperity for Palestinians as well as Israelis.
In Hebrew; the following is my translation
My wish is that the US government reflected what I believe is the view of most American Jews better - pro-Israel, anti-Bibi (ie the current far right government). 37% of American Jews are reform (left wing denomination) and 32% don’t identify with any branch (“culturally Jewish”). These are both dependably left wing constituencies, and are 69% of American Jews. Not surprisingly, 68% of American Jews voted for Biden.
Almost all of them that I know are strongly opposed to the current government. The religious extremism, the growing anti-LGBTQ sentiment, the attacks on the court - these are things that aren’t foreign to US politics and they are scary to the US left.
I think stronger anti-Bibi/pro-israel policy could be popular coming from democrats if the tightrope can be walked. It probably won’t happen until after the election. But President Harris doesn’t have to meet Bibi and give him a stage. We could tie military aid to more specific policies, maybe even to change in government or the expulsion of certain ministers. Yes, this would be meddling in Israeli politics, but to Binya’s point unconditional support only enables all this.
>Israel needs international legitimacy to survive.
I would put it very differently. Israel is caught between Scylla and Charybdis: it needs international legitimacy to maintain a high standard of living and an economy that can fight modern wars in the long run, but it also needs to reject the apparatus of international legitimacy to fight each and every war, knowing full well that Israeli wars are always viewed as illegitimate until or even after they are won.